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The aim of this paper is to show that increasing trade and having strict environmental policy are not mutually exclusive. I examine 
how the increase of trade under general oligopolistic equilibrium model affects environmental taxation. In particular, I show that 
with common assumptions, growth in trade increases environmental taxes.  
 
In Neary’s (2015) general oligopolistic equilibrium model, there is a continuum of sectors in which the firms compete in Cournot 
manner. The firms in each sector are identical, having market power in their own sector, but not at the level of the whole economy.  
The sectors are otherwise identical, but open sectors trade with a foreign country, while the rest of the sectors are closed. There 
are two identical countries which I call Home and Foreign.  
 
An environmental policy maker has perfect knowledge of the markets and the firms’ behavior. Because there is no abatement 
technology in the model, the policy maker sets a tax at the first and firms react to it at the second stage.  
 
The main result is that with general assumptions, increasing trade leads to increasing environmental tax. When the transaction 
costs of trade decrease, environmental taxes increase in the closed sectors, but decrease in the open sectors, the less, the larger 
the proportion of trading sectors in the economy is. When new sectors are opened to trade, then, provided that the share of 
domestic pollutant and the marginal environmental damage are sufficiently high, environmental taxes increase both in open and 
closed sectors.  
 
The main sources of the study are Neary (2015), which presents the general oligopolistic equilibrium model used in the analysis, 
and Richter (2015), which constructs strategic environmental policy in that setup.  
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Symbols used in the text 
 
z  a sector 
U  utility 
n   the number of firms  
x   output  
I  income of a representative household 
x(z)  a good produced in sector z 
p(z)                     a price of a product x(z) 
λ   the marginal utility of income 
D(E)  an environmental damage function 
E(z)   damage caused to the environment by sector z 
𝑒𝑖(𝑧)      emissions by a firm i in sector z 
𝑥𝑖(𝑧)   a product produced and sold by firm i in domestic market 
𝑦𝑖(𝑧)   a product produced domestically by a firm i but sold in a foreign market 
𝜑   perceived environmental damage 
𝛾   the percentage of pollution produced outside Home country’s borders 
t  environmental tax 
𝜋𝑖(𝑧)                   individual firm’s profit function in sector z 
w  wage  
C  costs 
η   an elasticity of demand 
d  trade costs 
L  labor supply 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The quality of the environment raises concerns, not only among scientists and activists, but also with the 
general public. Still, increasing trade and providing jobs appears to be enough reason to compromise 
environmental quality. This acceptance of lowered environmental standards stems from a belief that 
there must be a trade-off between high economic activities and environmental policies. The aim of this 
paper is to show that under a general oligopolistic equilibrium model and with certain assumptions, 
increasing trade increases environmental tax, too. 
The principal idea in the general oligopolistic equilibrium model by Neary (2015) is that there is a 
continuum of sectors, and companies have market power in their own sector, but not at a national level. 
This means that firms can act strategically only in their own sector but must take wages and factor prices 
as given.  
Of course, there are numerous excellent studies on oligopolistic markets and oligopolistic firms’ 
behavior, but as discussed in Neary (2015), in some cases the problem might be that the firms are 
considered oligopolistic in an economy-wide level, the case in which the firms would have influence over 
national income and this would influence their decision  making. As Richter (2014) shows, Neary’s 
general oligopolistic equilibrium model might be better suited for studying environmental tax in 
oligopolistic competition than partial equilibrium models, because changes in one sector often affect the 
market equilibrium in others.  
There exists a body of work that is based on general oligopolistic equilibrium model. Bastos and 
Kreickemeier (2009), for example, have used the model to study the effects of globalization on wages in 
sectors of which some have unionized and some non-unionized labor force. Similarly, there are excellent 
studies about trade and environment, like that of Kreickemeier and Richter (2014), in which they study 
the relationship between trade liberalization and the quality of the environment. But, perhaps 
surprisingly, there aren’t many studies that use the general oligopolistic equilibrium model while 
concentrating on environmental issues. In this regard Richter’s work is influential in its field. Another 
excellent study about environmental policies using a general oligopolistic equilibrium model, is by 
Colacicco (2017), but he focuses on the national economy, while Richter’s work concentrates on sectors.  
 
Palokangas (2015) has studied the interaction of policy-makers in the context of the wage determining 
process, but other than that, the policy making under general oligopolistic equilibrium has been scarcely 
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researched.  Therefore, the two studies, Richter (2014) and Colacicco (2017), are important, not only 
because of their environmental taxing insights, but because of studying public policy in Neary’s model as 
well. 
 
 In this study I follow Richter’s (2014) idea, in which he introduces the tax setting and the decision-
making processes as a two-stage game where a policy-maker moves first. It is assumed that the policy-
maker has perfect information about the firms’ decision making and the markets. The tax is the only 
available instrument, because there is no abatement technology. At the second stage the firms react to 
the tax, and because they operate in Cournot oligopoly, they make their production decisions 
simultaneously.  
I start by introducing the general equilibrium model and the basics of an optimal Pigouvian tax in 
oligopolistic markets. Next, I form the partial equilibriums in both open and closed sectors, and combine 
them into a general oligopolistic equilibrium. In chapter seven I analyze the effects the decreasing of the 
transaction costs of trade and opening new sectors to trade have on an optimal tax. The eighth chapter 
concludes. 
I follow Richter’s work closely because he provides excellent framework for my topic, but any mistakes, 
especially in derivations, are all mine. 
 
 
2. THE MODEL 
Following Neary (2015) there are only two countries, Home and Foreign, and they are considered 
identical. As in Richter (2014), any symbols representing the Foreign country are marked with (*) and an 
individual firm with subscript j. Subscript for a domestic individual firm is i.  
It is assumed that there is a continuum of sectors marked as z. In each sector there are a few competing 
but identical firms that produce a homogeneous good x (Neary, 2015). As in Kreickemeier and Meland 
(2013), an α percentage of these sectors participate in trade with a Foreign country and are called open. 
The rest of the sectors produce only for the domestic market and are referred as closed sectors. In open 
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sectors all firms trade, and in closed ones none do. The firms in both sector types, open and closed, treat 
variables such as wage level and labor supply that are determined at the national level, parametrically.  
The firms in each sector compete in Cournot competition, so they make the production decisions 
simultaneously and are therefore unaware of the other firms’ production amounts.   
 
2.1 Demand 
Another assumption in the general oligopolistic equilibrium model is that the preferences are additively 
separable. This allows the separation between the national economy level and sector level, and 
therefore an individual firm is small in economy but has some market power in its own sector (Neary 
2015, 5).  The representative household’s utility function becomes a continuum of goods consumed: 
𝑈[𝑥(𝑧)] = ∫ 𝑢[𝑥(𝑧)]𝑑𝑧,
1
0
                                                                        (1) 
where      𝑢(𝑧) = 𝑎𝑋(𝑧) −  
1
2
 𝑏(𝑋(𝑧))
2
,     𝑈′ > 0,     𝑈′′ <  0      and     𝑋 = ∑ 𝑥𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 . 
Because all firms in each sector are identical, we can write 
𝑋 = 𝑛𝑥, 
where n represents the number of firms and x an output of one firm. The budget constraint is the 
income, I, of a representative household,   
𝑝(𝑧)𝑋(𝑧) = 𝐼, 
where 𝑝(𝑧) is a price of a product 𝑥(𝑧).  
 The utility maximizing problem now becomes 
𝑈 [𝑎𝑋(𝑧) −  
1
2
 𝑏(𝑋(𝑧))
2
] −  𝜆 ∫  
1
0
[𝑝(𝑧)𝑋(𝑧) − 𝐼] 𝑑𝑧, 
where λ is the marginal utility of income 𝐼 and serves as a Lagrange multiplier. Solving for the first order 
conditions we get  
𝑋(𝑧) =  
1
𝑏
[𝑎 − 𝜆𝑝(𝑧)]                                                                     (2) 
as a demand function, and 
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𝑝(𝑧) =  
1
𝜆
[𝑎 − 𝑏𝑋(𝑧)]                                                                     (3) 
as an inverse demand function for good x produced by sector z. Because individual firms don’t have 
market power over national income level 𝐼, the firms take the marginal utility of income, λ, as given. The 
marginal utility of income can be solved by inserting the X(z) to the budget constraint  
∫  
1
0
[𝑝(𝑧)𝑋(𝑧) − 𝐼] 𝑑𝑧, = ∫  
1
0
[𝑝(𝑧)
𝑎 − 𝜆𝑝(𝑧)
𝑏
− 𝐼]  𝑑𝑧. 
We can write 
𝑝(𝑧)
𝑎 − 𝜆𝑝(𝑧)
𝑏
= 𝐼, 
And solve for λ: 
𝑎𝑝(𝑧) − 𝜆𝑝(𝑧)2
𝑏
= 𝐼,        𝑎𝑝(𝑧) − 𝜆𝑝(𝑧)2 − 𝐼 = 𝑏,       𝜆 =
𝑎𝑝(𝑧) − 𝑏𝐼
𝑝(𝑧)2
, 
where            𝑝(𝑧) = ∫  
1
0
𝑝(𝑧)𝑑𝑧            and                 𝑝(𝑧)2 = ∫ 𝑝(𝑧)2  𝑑𝑧 
1
0
, 
the first and the second moments of the price distribution. (Kreickemeier and Meland 2013, 777). 
 
Since the firms treat the marginal utility of income as a parameter, an inverse demand function becomes 
linear. This linearity is a fundamental part of the general oligopolistic equilibrium model and makes it 
suitable for studying oligopolistic behavior. (Kreickemeier and Meland 2013, 777). Since a and b are 
parameters, we see that because of additive separability the inverse demand depends only on its own 
quantity and the marginal utility of income.  
Because there is no money in the model, any nominal magnitude can be set equal to one. By choosing 
the marginal utility of income, λ, equal to one, the functions (3) become linear and independent of the 
income effect: 
𝑝(𝑧)= 𝑎−𝑏𝑋(𝑧). 
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3. ENVIRONMENTAL TAX 
Because of the assumption that there is no abatement technology, the tax is the only tool available for a 
policy maker.  
 
3.1. Damage to the Environment 
A damage function, D(E), describes the negative effects of pollutants to environment (Ollikainen, 2017a, 
4). Emissions, 𝑒𝑖(𝑧), can be written as 
𝑒𝑖(𝑧) = 𝑥𝑖(𝑧) + 𝑦𝑖(𝑧), 
where 𝑥𝑖(𝑧) is a product produced and sold by firm i in domestic market, and 𝑦𝑖(𝑧) is a product 
produced domestically by a firm i but sold in a foreign market. An environmental damage function, D(E), 
is defined as 
𝐷(𝑧) = 𝜑𝐸(𝑧),     where       𝐸(𝑧) = ∑ 𝑒𝑖(𝑧)
𝑛
𝑖=1
  +  𝛾 ∑ 𝑒𝑗(𝑧)
𝑛
𝑗=1
.                                        (4) 
The letter 𝜑 symbols the perceived environmental damage, or a preference for clean environment. The 
bigger its value is, the higher are the society’s preferences for clean environment.  E(z) is a damage 
caused to the environment by sector z. The letter 𝛾 ϵ (0,1) is a percentage of pollution that is produced 
outside of Home country’s borders. Should its value be unity, all the pollution comes from Foreign 
country, and should it be zero, all the pollutants are domestic. An environmental tax t is set for each unit 
of emissions. The tax is set separately for every sector z, and all sectors have only one environmental 
tax. (Richter 2014, 9). 
 
3.2. Pigouvian Tax in a Competitive Market 
A policy maker seeks to tax this externality, the damage to environment, D(E), at the level that 
maximizes a benefit to whole society. The policy maker knows that firms react to the tax by maximizing 
they own welfare. After tax an individual firm’s profit function 𝜋𝑖(𝑧) is 
𝜋𝑖(𝑧) = 𝑝(𝑧)𝑥𝑖(𝑧) − (𝑐 + 𝑡)𝑥𝑖(𝑧), 
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where 𝑝(𝑧) is a price of one product and 𝑥𝑖(𝑧) a production of the firm i.  C is costs, and t is an 
environmental tax. After derivation we have: 
𝜕𝜋𝑖(𝑧)
𝜕𝑥𝑖
= 𝑝 − 𝑐𝑖 − 𝑡 =  0. 
 In competitive markets firms optimize they production amount at the point where marginal profit 
equals marginal cost:  
𝑝 = 𝑐𝑖 + 𝑡. 
 
The social planner constructs a social welfare function, SW, by defining the consumer surplus, CS, as 
𝐶𝑆 = ∫ 𝑝(𝑣)𝑑𝑣 − 𝑝𝑋,
𝑋
0
        where       𝑋 = ∑ 𝑥𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
. 
As already stated in previous chapter, we can write 
𝑋 = 𝑛𝑥. 
The producer surplus, PS, is defined as 
𝑃𝑆 = 𝑝𝑋 − 𝑛𝑐𝑥, 
where c stands for private costs of an individual firm. The social costs, i.e. an environmental damage 
function (4) is already defined, so the social welfare function, SW, can be written as 
𝑆𝑊 = 𝑃𝑆 +  𝐶𝑆 − 𝐷(𝐸) = ∫ 𝑝(𝑣)𝑑𝑣 − 𝑛𝑐𝑥 − 𝐷(𝐸).  
𝑥
0
 
Since the lower limit of the integral is zero, derivation becomes shorter: 
𝜕𝑆𝑊
𝜕𝑥𝑖
∫ 𝑝(𝑋)
𝜕𝑋
𝜕𝑥𝑖
− 𝑛𝑐 − 𝐷′(𝐸) =  𝑝(𝑋)𝑛 
𝑥
0
− 𝑛𝑐 − 𝐷′(𝐸) = 0. 
We can divide this by the number of firms, n, and have 
𝑝(𝑋)  − 𝑐 − 𝐷′(𝐸)  =  0. 
 
10 
 
Since we are constructing the Pigouvian tax first at the competitive markets, the firms must take the 
price as a given, so p(X) can be written as an average of p, and we can write  
𝜕𝑆𝑊
𝜕𝑥𝑖
= 𝑝 − 𝑐 − 𝐷′(𝐸)  =  0. 
At the optimum the private optimal benefit must equal to social optimal benefit, which they do when 
both derivatives equal zero: 
𝜕𝜋𝑖(𝑧)
𝜕𝑥𝑖
= 𝑝 − 𝑐 − 𝑡 =  
𝜕𝑆𝑊
𝜕𝑥𝑖
= 𝑝 − 𝑐 − 𝐷′(𝐸)  =  0. 
This leads to a result  
𝑡 = 𝐷′(𝐸). 
It can be concluded that in competitive markets an optimal Pigouvian tax equals the marginal 
environmental damage. (Ollikainen 2017a). 
 
3.3. Tax in Cournot Oligopoly 
Unlike in the case of competitive markets, in Cournot oligopoly firms seek to make some profit π. An 
individual firm’s profit function is the same as before: 
𝜋𝑖(𝑧) = 𝑝(𝑧)𝑥𝑖(𝑧) − 𝑐𝑥𝑖(𝑧) − 𝑡𝑥𝑖(𝑧), 
But when in competitive markets the firms take a price p as given, in oligopoly they can affect the price 
via production amounts. Therefore, when in the previous chapter 𝑝(𝑋) was an average of p, it is now a 
function. This means that the derivative is now 
𝜕𝜋𝑖
𝜕𝑥𝑖
= 𝑝(𝑋)
𝜕𝑋
𝜕𝑥𝑖
+
𝜕𝑃(𝑋)
𝜕𝑥𝑖
𝑥𝑖 − 𝑐 − 𝑡 = 0 = 𝑝(𝑋) + 𝑝
′𝑥𝑖 − 𝑐 − 𝑡 = 0. 
The social welfare function, and hence its derivative, are also the same as in perfectly competitive 
markets: 
𝜕𝑆𝑊
𝜕𝑥𝑖
∫ 𝑝(𝑋)
𝜕𝑋
𝜕𝑥𝑖
− 𝑛𝑐 − 𝐷′(𝐸) =  𝑝(𝑋)𝑛 
𝑥
0
− 𝑛𝑐 − 𝐷′(𝐸) = 0, 
and after dividing it with n we have 
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𝑝(𝑋) − 𝑐 − 𝐷′(𝐸) = 0. 
Next, we substitute the oligopolist’s optimal condition 
𝑝(𝑋) =  −𝑝′𝑥𝑖 + 𝑐 + 𝑡 
to the derivative of a social welfare function and get 
𝑆𝑊′ = −𝑝′𝑥𝑖 + 𝑐 + 𝑡 − 𝑐 − 𝐷
′(𝐸) = −𝑝′𝑥𝑖 + 𝑡 − 𝜑 = 0. 
This gives an optimal tax for an oligopoly as 
𝑡 = 𝜑 + 𝑝′𝑥.                                                                          (5) 
The second term can be written as 
𝑝′𝑥 =
𝑝′𝑋
𝑛
, 
After which we multiply both numerator and denominator by p and get 
𝑝𝑝′𝑋
𝑝𝑛
 =  
𝑝
𝜂𝑛
, 
where η is an elasticity of demand. Because an elasticity of demand of a normal good is negative, the 
whole second term is negative. This means that an optimal tax for oligopoly is lower than in a perfectly 
competitive market. The second term absorbs the damage of oligopoly market not being efficient, and 
the lower the number of firms in an oligopoly is, the larger the second term is, which in turn lowers the 
tax further. Also, the lower the elasticity of demand is, the lower is the tax.  We can conclude that more 
distortion there is to the market, whether by the lack of firms operating in it or because of the 
inelasticity of demand, the higher is the cost of an inefficiency of the market to the society. (Ollikainen 
2017b). 
 
 
4. CLOSED SECTORS 
 We can now derive the partial equilibriums for closed and open sectors. The firms take a wage level as 
given. As already stated, the firms make some profit in Cournot oligopoly, and their profit functions is 
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𝜋𝑖(𝑧) = 𝑝(𝑧)𝑥𝑖(𝑧) − 𝑐𝑥𝑖(𝑧). 
By substituting for 𝑝(𝑧) =  𝑎 –  𝑏𝑋 (λ has a value of one) from equation (3) we have: 
𝜋𝑖(𝑧) = 𝑎𝑥𝑖 − 𝑏𝑥𝑖 ∑ 𝑥𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
− 𝑐𝑥𝑖 = 𝑎𝑥𝑖 − 𝑏𝑥𝑖(𝑥1 + 𝑥2 . . . 𝑥𝑛) − 𝑐𝑥𝑖. 
Taking a derivative, we get 
𝜕𝜋𝑖(𝑧)
𝜕𝑥𝑖
= 𝑎 − 𝑏(𝑥1 + 𝑥2 . . . 𝑥𝑛−1 + 2𝑥𝑖) − 𝑐𝑥𝑖, 
and since all firms are identical, we can set  
∑ 𝑥𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
 = 𝑛𝑥𝑖.  
The firms maximize their profit accordingly: 
𝜕𝜋𝑖(𝑧)
𝜕𝑥𝑖
= 𝑎 − 𝑏(𝑛 + 1)𝑥𝑖 − 𝑐𝑥𝑖  =  0. 
The firms’ costs consist of wage, w, and the tax, t. An optimal production can now be solved, and the 
result is a familiar Cournot competition optimum: 
𝑥𝑖(𝑧) =
𝑎 − 𝑐
𝑏(𝑛 + 1)
=
𝑎 − 𝑤 − 𝑡(𝑧)
𝑏(𝑛 + 1)
 . 
This optimal value of 𝑥𝑖 and the tax in Cournot oligopoly already solved in a previous chapter can now 
be combined: 
𝑡𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑑(𝑧) = 𝐷′(𝐸) + 𝑝′𝑥 =  𝐷′(𝐸) − 𝑏𝑥𝑖 =  𝐷
′(𝐸) − 𝑏
(𝑎 − 𝑤 − 𝑡)
𝑏(𝑛 + 1)
. 
Solving for tax  
(𝑛 + 1 − 1)𝑡𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑑(𝑧) = (𝑛 + 1)𝐷′(𝐸) − 𝑎 + 𝑤 
𝑡𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑑(𝑧) =
(𝑛 + 1)𝐷′(𝐸) − (𝑎 − 𝑤)
𝑛
. 
The tax includes one negative term, -a/n. As in previous chapter, the higher the number of firms, the 
closer to the value of the tax in fully competitive market this tax becomes. We can conclude that the 
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lower the number of firms, n, is, the lower is the tax and the bigger the cost of market imperfection to 
the society. (Richter 2014, 11). 
 
These two equations, 𝑥𝑖(𝑧) and tax, can now be combined by inserting tax into the equation of an 
output 
𝑥𝑖(𝑧) =  
(𝑎 − 𝑤 − (
(𝑛 + 1)𝐷′(𝐸) − (𝑎 − 𝑤)
𝑛 )
𝑏(𝑛 + 1)
  . 
Multiplying both sides by n we get 
𝑛𝑥𝑖(𝑧) =
𝑛𝑎 − 𝑛𝑤 + (𝑎 − 𝑤) − (𝑛 + 1)𝐷′(𝐸)
𝑏(𝑛 + 1)
, 
which gives the optimal value of  
𝑥𝑖(𝑧) =
𝑎 − 𝑤 − 𝐷′(𝐸)
𝑏𝑛
. 
Inserting this to the price function (3) we get the price for products in closed sectors: 
𝑝(𝑧) = 𝑎 − 𝑏𝑛
𝑎 − 𝑤 − 𝐷′(𝐸)
𝑏𝑛
=  𝑤 + 𝐷′(𝐸). 
We can conclude that the price consists of the wage and the marginal damage to the environment, 
meaning that it includes both, the private and social costs. (Richter 2014, 12). 
 
 
5. OPEN SECTORS 
The firms in these sectors trade with the Foreign country. A good produced domestically but sold in the 
Foreign country is marked as yi, and the trading costs are marked with d. As in closed sectors, the firms’ 
costs include wages and an environmental tax, but now there are also the trade costs, so the cost 
function in open sectors becomes 
𝑐𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑛(𝑧) = (𝑤 + 𝑡)𝑥𝑖(𝑧) + (𝑤 + 𝑡 + 𝑑)𝑦𝑖(𝑧). 
Therefore, the profit function of an individual firm is 
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𝜋𝑖(𝑧) = 𝑝(𝑧)𝑥𝑖(𝑧) + 𝑝
∗(𝑧)𝑦𝑖(𝑧) − (𝑤 + 𝑡)𝑥𝑖(𝑧) − (𝑤 + 𝑡 + 𝑑)𝑦𝑖(𝑧). 
Since the two countries are identical, the number of firms operating in each open sector is now n+n* = 
2n. Because of this identicality, it can also be assumed that domestic price equals the foreign price, i.e. 
𝑝(𝑧)  = 𝑝∗(𝑧). Following Richter (2014) we separate the taxes by writing the tax of the product sold in a 
foreign country as t*, so the profit function is now 
𝜋𝑖(𝑧) = 𝑝(𝑧)(𝑥𝑖(𝑧) + 𝑦𝑖(𝑧)) − (𝑤 + 𝑡)𝑥𝑖(𝑧) − (𝑤 + 𝑡 ∗ +𝑑)𝑦𝑖(𝑧). 
Substituting the function of price, equation (3), we get 
𝜋𝑖(𝑧) = 𝑎(𝑥𝑖 + 𝑦𝑖) − 𝑏𝑥𝑖(∑ 𝑥𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
+ ∑ 𝑦𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
) − 𝑐(𝑥𝑖 + 𝑦𝑖) 
= 𝑎(𝑥𝑖 + 𝑦𝑖) − 𝑏𝑥𝑖(𝑥1 + 𝑥2 … 𝑥𝑛) − 𝑏𝑥𝑖(𝑦1 + 𝑦2 … 𝑦𝑛) − 𝑐(𝑥𝑖 + 𝑦𝑖). 
Taking a partial derivative regarding the 𝑥𝑖 we have 
𝜕𝜋𝑖(𝑧)
𝜕𝑥𝑖
= 𝑎 − 𝑏(𝑥1 + 𝑥2 . . . 𝑥𝑛−1 + 2𝑥𝑖) − 𝑏(𝑦1 + 𝑦2 . . . 𝑦𝑛) − 𝑤 − 𝑡 = 0. 
Again, assuming the identicality of the firms, the derivative becomes 
𝜕𝜋𝑖(𝑧)
𝜕𝑥𝑖
= 𝑎 − 𝑏(𝑛 + 1)𝑥𝑖 − 𝑏𝑛𝑦𝑖 − 𝑤 − 𝑡 =  0. 
Partial derivative regarding to 𝑦𝑖  can be solved in similar fashion 
𝜕𝜋𝑖(𝑧)
𝜕𝑦𝑖
= 𝑎 − 𝑏(𝑛 + 1)𝑦𝑖 − 𝑏𝑛𝑥𝑖 − 𝑤 − 𝑡 ∗ −𝑑 = 0. 
Now the optimal 𝑦𝑖  can be solved: 
𝑦𝑖 =
𝑎 − 𝑏𝑛𝑥𝑖 − 𝑤 − 𝑡 ∗ −𝑑
𝑏(𝑛 + 1)
. 
This result can now be substituted to derivative regarding to 𝑥𝑖: 
𝜕𝜋𝑖(𝑧)
𝜕𝑥𝑖
= 𝑎 − 𝑏(𝑛 + 1)𝑥𝑖 − 𝑏𝑛(
𝑎 − 𝑏𝑛𝑥𝑖 − 𝑤 − 𝑡 ∗ −𝑑
𝑏(𝑛 + 1)
) − 𝑤 − 𝑡 =  0. 
Rearranging we get 
[(𝑏(𝑛 + 1))2  − (𝑏𝑛)2]𝑥𝑖 = −𝑏𝑛(𝑎 − 𝑤 − 𝑡 ∗ −𝑑) + 𝑏(𝑛 + 1)(𝑎 − 𝑤 − 𝑡)  
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[𝑏2(𝑛2 + 2𝑛 + 1) − (𝑏𝑛)2]𝑥𝑖   = −𝑏𝑛(𝑎 − 𝑤 − 𝑡 ∗ −𝑑) + 𝑏(𝑛 + 1)(𝑎 − 𝑤 − 𝑡). 
The same can be done to 𝑦𝑖(𝑧), and we get the values 
𝑥𝑖(𝑧) =  
𝑎 − 𝑤 − (𝑛 + 1)𝑡(𝑧) + 𝑛𝑡∗(𝑧) + 𝑛𝑑
(2𝑛 + 1)𝑏
        
𝑦𝑖(𝑧) =  
𝑎 − 𝑤 − (𝑛 + 1)𝑡(𝑧) + 𝑛𝑡∗(𝑧) − (𝑛 + 1)𝑑
(2𝑛 + 1)𝑏
.  
 
As in closed sectors, the social welfare function of open sectors (Richter 2014, 13) includes the private 
costs C and the marginal damage function 𝐷(𝐸). The surpluses, however, are now calculated by adding 
the net trade surplus, S, in sector z, and the utility of domestic consumption, U together: 
  𝑆𝑊 = 𝑈(𝑧) +  𝑆(𝑧) − 𝐷(𝐸) − 𝐶(𝑧).                                                           (6) 
We can solve this function by one term at the time, beginning from the U(z). This utility function (1) we 
already know, but because the firms now trade, the domestic consumption includes imported good 𝑦𝑗. 
Due to the symmetry of the countries, we can take an advantage of the value of 𝑦𝑖  from above and write 
the function of  
𝑦𝑗(𝑧) =  
𝑎 − 𝑤 − (𝑛 + 1)𝑡∗(𝑧) + 𝑛𝑡(𝑧) − (𝑛 + 1)𝑑
(2𝑛 + 1)𝑏
. 
The utility  
 𝑢(𝑧) = 𝑎𝑋(𝑧) −  
1
2
 𝑏(𝑋(𝑧))
2
, 
where      𝑋 = ∑ 𝑥𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
  + ∑ 𝑦𝑗
𝑛
𝑖=1
 = 𝑛𝑥𝑖 + 𝑛𝑦𝑗      so        𝑢(𝑧) = 𝑎(𝑛𝑥𝑖 + 𝑛𝑦𝑗) − 
1
2
 𝑏(𝑛𝑥𝑖 + 𝑛𝑦𝑗)
2 
. 
Inserting the values of production, we get 
𝑢(𝑧) = 𝑎𝑛 (
𝑎 − 𝑤 − (𝑛 + 1)𝑡(𝑧) + 𝑛𝑡∗(𝑧) + 𝑛𝑑
(2𝑛 + 1)𝑏
+
𝑎 − 𝑤 − (𝑛 + 1)𝑡∗(𝑧) + 𝑛𝑡(𝑧) − (𝑛 + 1)𝑑
(2𝑛 + 1)𝑏
) 
− 
1
2
 𝑏𝑛 (      
𝑎 − 𝑤 − (𝑛 + 1)𝑡(𝑧) + 𝑛𝑡∗(𝑧) + 𝑛𝑑
(2𝑛 + 1)𝑏
+
𝑎 − 𝑤 − (𝑛 + 1)𝑡∗(𝑧) + 𝑛𝑡(𝑧) − (𝑛 + 1)𝑑
(2𝑛 + 1)𝑏
)
2 
. 
We can write down all the terms that include the tax t: 
16 
 
𝑎𝑛
(2𝑛 + 1)
𝑏(2𝑛 + 1)2
(−𝑡) − 
𝑛2 (−4𝑎𝑡 + 4𝑤𝑡 + 𝑡2 + 2𝑡𝑡∗ + 2𝑑𝑡
2𝑏(2𝑛 + 1)2
 =  
𝑛 (−𝑎𝑡 − 2𝑛𝑤𝑡 −
𝑛
2 𝑡
2 − 𝑛𝑡𝑡∗ − 𝑛𝑑𝑡
𝑏(2𝑛 + 1)2
. 
After taking a derivative regarding to t we have: 
𝜕𝑈
𝜕𝑡
=
𝑛 (−𝑎 − 2𝑛𝑤 − 𝑛𝑡 − 𝑛𝑡∗ − 𝑛𝑑
𝑏(2𝑛 + 1)2
.                                                        (7) 
 
The net trade surplus, S, (Richter 2014, 13) consists of a domestic product sold in Foreign market, yi, 
minus the transportation costs and the income that Foreign country earned by importing the product yj 
into Home country: 
  𝑆 = (𝑝*(𝑧) − 𝑑)𝑦𝑖(𝑧) − 𝑝(𝑧)𝑦𝑗(𝑧). 
Since the foreign price p* is identical to the domestic one, we can set them equal in solving the equation. 
We multiply the first term, the function of p∗ 𝑦𝑖(𝑧), first, and again, write down only the terms that 
include the tax t: 
−𝑎𝑛(𝑛 + 1)𝑡(2𝑛 + 1)
𝑏(2𝑛 + 1)2
 
−𝑛2[−2(𝑛 + 1)𝑎𝑡 + 2(𝑛 + 1)𝑤𝑡 + (𝑛 + 1)2𝑡2 − 2𝑛(𝑛 + 1)𝑡𝑡∗ − 2(𝑛 + 1)𝑑𝑡]
𝑏(2𝑛 + 1)2
. 
Next are the transportation costs, d𝑦𝑖(𝑧).  Again, to keep the functions more readable only the terms 
that include the tax t are written down: 
 
𝑛𝑑(𝑛 + 1)𝑡(2𝑛 + 1)
𝑏(2𝑛 + 1)2
. 
Finally, the terms that include the tax t in the function of 𝑝(𝑧)𝑦𝑗(𝑧) are 
𝑎𝑛(𝑛)𝑡(2𝑛 + 1)
𝑏(2𝑛 + 1)2
 
−𝑛2[2𝑛𝑎𝑡 − 2𝑛𝑤𝑡 + 𝑛2𝑡2 − 2𝑛(𝑛 + 1)𝑡𝑡∗ + 2𝑛(𝑛 + 1)𝑑𝑡]
𝑏(2𝑛 + 1)2
. 
Now we combine all these terms to write all the terms that include tax t in the function of net trade 
surplus, S: 
 
𝑛 [−(2𝑛 + 1)𝑎𝑡 − 2𝑛(2𝑛 + 1)𝑤𝑡 − 𝑛(2𝑛 + 1)𝑡2 + (2𝑛 + 1)𝑑𝑡]
𝑏(2𝑛 + 1)2
. 
And after derivation we get 
𝜕𝑆
𝜕𝑡
=  
𝑛 [−(2𝑛 + 1)𝑎 − 2𝑛(2𝑛 + 1)𝑤 − 2𝑛(2𝑛 + 1)𝑡 + (2𝑛 + 1)𝑑]
𝑏(2𝑛 + 1)2
.                         (8) 
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Private costs consist of wages and trade costs, but since trade costs are already included in the previous 
sectoral net trade surplus function, the costs are 
𝐶 =  −𝑤𝑛(𝑥𝑖 + 𝑦𝑖 ) 
= −𝑤𝑛 
𝑎 − 𝑤 − (𝑛 + 1)𝑡(𝑧) + 𝑛𝑡∗(𝑧) + 𝑛𝑑
(2𝑛 + 1)𝑏
 + 
𝑎 − 𝑤 − (𝑛 + 1)𝑡(𝑧) + 𝑛𝑡∗(𝑧) − (𝑛 + 1)𝑑
(2𝑛 + 1)𝑏
 
    =  
−𝑤𝑛(2𝑎 − 2𝑤 − 2(𝑛 + 1)𝑡 + 2𝑛𝑡∗ − 𝑑)
𝑏(2𝑛 + 1)
 . 
After derivation we have 
      
𝜕𝐶
𝜕𝑡
=  
𝑛 𝑤(2(𝑛 + 1)(2𝑛 + 1)
𝑏(2𝑛 + 1)2
 .                                                           (9) 
 
The last term in the social welfare function to derivate is the marginal damage to the environment 
function (4): 
𝐸(𝑧) = ∑ [𝑥𝑖(𝑧) + 𝑦𝑖(𝑧)
𝑛
𝑖=1
]   +  𝛾 ∑ [𝑥𝑗(𝑧) + 𝑦𝑗(𝑧)]
𝑛
𝑗=1
 . 
After inserting all four functions of domestic and foreign goods, 𝑥𝑖(𝑧), 𝑦𝑖(𝑧), 𝑥𝑗(𝑧)𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑦𝑗(𝑧), and 
performing the simple calculations, an environmental damage function can be written as 
𝐸(𝑧) =  𝑛
(2𝑎 − 2𝑤 − 2(𝑛 + 1)𝑡 + 2𝑛𝑡∗ − 𝑑)𝜑
𝑏(2𝑛 + 1)
+  𝛾𝑛
(2𝑎 − 2𝑤 − 2(𝑛 + 1)𝑡∗ + 2𝑛𝑡  − 𝑑)𝜑
𝑏(2𝑛 + 1)
, 
where 𝜑 is a perceived marginal environmental damage. After the multiplications the terms including 
the tax are 
𝑛(−2(𝑛 + 1)𝑡 + 2𝑛𝑡∗ )𝜑
𝑏(2𝑛 + 1)
+  𝛾
𝑛(−2(𝑛 + 1)𝑡∗ + 2𝑛𝑡)𝜑
𝑏(2𝑛 + 1)
 
=  
𝑛(−2𝑛𝑡 − 2𝑡 + 2𝑛𝑡∗ − 𝛾2𝑛𝑡∗ − 𝛾2𝑡∗ + 𝛾2𝑛𝑡)𝜑
𝑏(2𝑛 + 1)
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=  
 𝑛(−2(𝑛 + 1 − 𝑛𝛾)𝑡 − 2(𝛾 − 𝑛 + 𝛾𝑛)𝑡∗ )𝜑
𝑏(2𝑛 + 1)
. 
Now we can take a derivative regarding to t and have 
𝜕𝐷(𝐸)
𝜕𝑡
=  
−𝑛 (2𝑛 + 1)2(𝑛 + 1 − 𝑛𝛾)𝜑
𝑏(2𝑛 + 1)2
 .                                                 (10) 
 
These partial derivatives of the social welfare function, (7), (8), (9) and (10), can now be combined to 
form a derivative of the social welfare function of open sectors: 
𝜕𝑆𝑊 
𝜕𝑡
=  
𝜕𝑈 
𝜕𝑡
+  
𝜕𝑆
𝜕𝑡
−
𝜕𝐶
𝜕𝑡
−  
𝜕𝐷(𝐸)
𝜕𝑡
 
=  
𝑛 [−2(𝑛 + 1)(𝑎 − 𝑤) − 𝑛(4𝑛 + 3)𝑡 − 𝑛𝑡∗ + (𝑛 + 1)𝑑 + 2(2𝑛 + 1)(𝑛 + 1 − 𝑛𝛾)𝜑]
𝑏(2𝑛 + 1)2
= 0. 
The optimal value of t becomes  
𝑡(𝑧) =  
−2(𝑛 + 1)(𝑎 − 𝑤) − 𝑛𝑡∗ + (𝑛 + 1)𝑑 + 2(2𝑛 + 1)(𝑛 + 1 − 𝑛𝛾)𝜑
𝑛(4𝑛 + 3)
. 
Still following Richter (2014), because the two trading countries are identical, the tax in both countries 
can be assumed to be set similarly. Using this we can write t = t*: 
(𝑛(4𝑛 + 3) + 𝑛)𝑡 = −2(𝑛 + 1)(𝑎 − 𝑤) + (𝑛 + 1)𝑑 + 2(2𝑛 + 1)(𝑛 + 1 − 𝑛𝛾)𝜑, 
and solve for an optimal tax: 
𝑡𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑛(𝑧) =  
−2(𝑛 + 1)(𝑎 − 𝑤) + (𝑛 + 1)𝑑 + 2(2𝑛 + 1)(𝑛 + 1 − 𝑛𝛾)𝜑
4𝑛(𝑛 + 1)
.                       (11) 
As in closed sectors, the higher costs and domestically caused environmental damages increase the tax. 
(Richter 2014). 
 
Now that the tax is set, we can insert it to the functions of x and y and solve for optimal production 
amounts: 
𝑥𝑖
𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑛(𝑧) =  
2(𝑛 + 1)(𝑎 − 𝑤) + (𝑛 + 1)(2𝑛 − 1)d − 2(𝑛 + 1 − 𝑛𝛾)𝜑
4𝑛(𝑛 + 1)𝑏
     
19 
 
𝑦𝑖
𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑛(𝑧) =  
2(𝑛 + 1)(𝑎 − 𝑤) − (𝑛 + 1)(2𝑛 + 1)𝑑 − 2(𝑛 + 1 − 𝑛𝛾)𝜑
4𝑛(𝑛 + 1)𝑏
 .   
Again, like in close sectors, the higher the costs, the lower the output. We see that the bigger the trade 
cost d is, the more is produced to domestic market. When trade costs decrease, a bigger share of 
domestic production is sold in a Foreign market. (Richter 2014). 
 
 
6. COMPARISONS BETWEEN CLOSED AND OPEN SECTORS 
Due to all sectors having the same number of domestically operating firms, n, and only the participation 
in trade setting them apart, we can determine which sector type has a higher environmental by 
calculating the difference between the taxes as 
𝑡𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑛(𝑧) − 𝑡𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑑(𝑧) = 
−2(𝑛 + 1)(𝑎 − 𝑤) + (𝑛 + 1)𝑑 + 2(2𝑛 + 1)(𝑛 + 1 − 𝑛𝛾)𝜑
4𝑛(𝑛 + 1)
− 
(4𝑛 + 4)((𝑛 + 1)𝜑 − (𝑎 − 𝑤))
4𝑛(𝑛 + 1)
 
=
−2(𝑛 + 1)(𝑎 − 𝑤) + (𝑛 + 1)𝑑 + (4𝑛 + 2)(𝑛 + 1 − 𝑛𝛾)𝜑
4𝑛(𝑛 + 1)
−  
(4𝑛 + 4)(−𝑎 + 𝑤 + (𝑛 + 1)𝜑)
4𝑛(𝑛 + 1)
 
=  
2(𝑛 + 1)(𝑎 − 𝑤) + (𝑛 + 1)𝑑 − 2((𝑛 + 1) + 𝑛(2𝑛 + 1)𝛾)𝜑
4𝑛(𝑛 + 1)
  . 
This result is unclear because several variables influence the tax. (Richter 2014). However, we can 
conclude that 
 the more likely the tax in open sectors is higher when trade costs are high, the wage level and perceived 
marginal environmental damage are low, or when a pollutant is mostly foreign.  
 
To see the effects the different variables have on taxes, we can look at comparative statics starting with 
the wage level: 
𝜕𝑡𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑛(𝑧)
𝜕𝑤
=
2(𝑛 + 1)
𝑛4(𝑛 + 1)
=  
1
2𝑛
      <        
𝜕𝑡𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑑(𝑧)
𝜕𝑤
=   
(4𝑛 + 1)
𝑛4(𝑛 + 1)
=  
1
𝑛
  .   
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An increase in the wage level increases the tax in both sector types, but because there are more firms 
producing to the open sectors’ markets, the effect is smaller in open sectors. Therefore, it can be 
concluded that the more firms there are, the less the increase in wage level increases the tax. 
 
A change in the perceived marginal environmental damage, 𝜑, in both sector types: 
𝜕𝑡𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑛(𝑧)
𝜕𝜑
=
(4𝑛 + 2)(𝑛 + 1 − 𝑛𝛾)
4𝑛(𝑛 + 1)
=
(2𝑛 + 1)(𝑛 + 1 − 𝑛𝛾)
2𝑛(𝑛 + 1)
 =
(2𝑛2 + 3𝑛 + 1 − 2𝑛2𝛾 − 𝑛𝛾)
2𝑛(𝑛 + 1)
    
<      
 𝜕𝑡𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑑(𝑧)
𝜕𝜑
=  
(2𝑛 + 2)(𝑛 + 1)
2𝑛(𝑛 + 1)
=
(2𝑛2 + 4𝑛 + 2)
2𝑛(𝑛 + 1)
. 
The tax in closed sectors increases more should there be an increase in perceived marginal 
environmental damage. An increase is the same in closed sectors regardless of pollutant being domestic 
or foreign.  
Now, if all the pollutant is domestic, meaning γ = 0, and the perceived marginal environmental damage 
increases: 
𝜕𝑡𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑛(𝑧)
𝜕𝜑
=
(4𝑛 + 2)(𝑛 + 1)
4𝑛(𝑛 + 1)
=  
2𝑛 + 1
2𝑛
     <     
 𝜕𝑡𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑑(𝑧)
𝜕𝜑
=  
𝑛 + 1
𝑛
 . 
The difference between the sector types is much smaller. 
Finally, if all the pollutant is foreign, meaning γ =1: 
𝜕𝑡𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑛(𝑧)
𝜕𝜑
=
(4𝑛 + 2)(𝑛 + 1 − 𝑛𝛾)
4𝑛(𝑛 + 1)
=
2𝑛 + 1
2𝑛(𝑛 + 1)
     <      
 𝜕𝑡𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑑(𝑧)
𝜕𝜑
=  
(2𝑛 + 2)(𝑛 + 1)
2𝑛(𝑛 + 1)
. 
The firms in closed sectors have a higher increase in tax.  
 
While it can’t be determined whether an environmental tax is higher in trading or non-trading sectors, 
the tax in closed sector is more vulnerable to changes in costs or pollution amounts. This is often due to 
fewer firms operating in closed markets. Richter (2014, 14) calculates the difference in sectoral taxes in 
a situation where both sector types, open and closed, have the same number of firms. This may first 
seem just a convenient way to achieve a more desirable result, but it can also be a more accurate way to 
compare taxes, because in open sectors there are twice as many firms operating in each sector, but only 
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half of them, amount n, have production and emit pollution in the Home country. It can be assumed 
that the Home country can set a tax to domestic firms only. Should the foreign pollutant be taxed, it may 
be done via import taxes and be included in transport costs. So, setting the number of firms as n in all 
sectors, we can calculate the difference between the taxes again: 
𝑡𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑛(𝑧) − 𝑡𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑑(𝑧)|𝑛=𝑛𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑛 = 
−2(𝑛 + 1)(𝑎 − 𝑤) + (𝑛 + 1)𝑑 + 2(𝑛 + 1)(𝑛 + 1 − 𝑛𝛾)𝜑
2𝑛(𝑛 + 1)
−  
(2𝑛 + 2)((𝑛 + 1)𝜑 − (𝑎 − 𝑤))
2𝑛(𝑛 + 1)
 
=
(𝑛 + 1)𝑑 + (2𝑛 + 2)(𝑛 + 1 − 𝑛𝛾)𝜑
2𝑛(𝑛 + 1)
− 
(2𝑛 + 2)(𝑛 + 1)𝜑
2𝑛(𝑛 + 1)
 
=
(𝑛 + 1)𝑑 − 2𝑛(𝑛 + 1)𝛾𝜑
2𝑛(𝑛 + 1)
 =
𝑑 − 2𝑛𝛾𝜑
2𝑛
 . 
This result means that the tax in open sectors is higher only when the term 2𝑛𝛾𝜑 is smaller than 
transportation costs. This is more likely to happen if a perceived marginal damage to the environment is 
low, if the number of firms, n, is low, or if pollutant is mostly domestic (low γ). Should all emissions be 
results of a domestic production, meaning γ=0, the tax is higher in open sectors.  
It can also be concluded that when the number of firms is set the same in all sectors, the changes in 
wage level and in marginal environmental damage caused by domestic pollutant have equally big effects 
on both taxes.  
 
Since the tax in turn influences the firms’ production decisions, let’s compare the derivatives of  
domestic output, xopen(z) and  xclosed(z) regarding to tax to see which sector is higher influenced 
should there be an increase in tax: 
𝜕𝑥𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑑(𝑧)
𝜕𝑡
=   
−1
𝑏(𝑛 + 1)
           and            
𝜕𝑥𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑛(𝑧)
𝜕𝑡
=
𝜕𝑦𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑛(𝑧)
𝜕𝑡
=   
−1
𝑏(2𝑛 + 1)
 . 
Because a tax is a cost to firms, the derivatives regarding to tax are negative. An increase in tax lowers 
the production amounts in both sector types, but the effect is smaller in open sectors. Again, this is due 
to a bigger number of firms. Should the number of firms be the same in all sectors, the effect would be 
the same too.  
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We can conclude that the more firms there are operating in the same market, the lesser is the effect of 
the change in tax on production.  
 
 
7. GENERAL OLIGOPOLISTIC EQUILIBRIUM 
The partial equilibriums can be combined at the national economy level to form a general oligopolistic 
equilibrium. The supply of labor, L, is inelastic and the full employment is assumed. As was with the 
wage and other variables determined at the national level, the firms must take the supply of labor as 
given. The general oligopolistic equilibrium is formed by adding all domestic production together, and 
supply of labor acting as a constraint: 
𝐿 = 𝐿𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑛 + 𝐿𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑑 =  𝑛 ∫ (𝑥𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑛(𝑧) + 𝑦𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑛(𝑧))
𝛼
0
 𝑑𝑧 +   𝑛 ∫ (𝑥𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑑(𝑧))
1
𝛼
 𝑑𝑧 
=
𝛼𝑛[2(𝑛 + 1)(𝑎 − 𝑤) + (𝑛 + 1)(2𝑛 − 1)𝑑 − 2(𝑛 + 1 − 𝑛𝛾)𝜑
4𝑛(𝑛 + 1)𝑏
 
+ 
2(𝑛 + 1)(𝑎 − 𝑤) − (𝑛 + 1)(2𝑛 + 1)𝑑 − 2(𝑛 + 1 − 𝑛𝛾)𝜑]
4𝑛(𝑛 + 1)𝑏
+ (1 − 𝛼) 𝑛 
𝑎 − 𝑤 − 𝜑
𝑏𝑛
 
=
𝛼𝑛[4(𝑛 + 1)(𝑎 − 𝑤) − 2(𝑛 + 1)𝑑 − 4(𝑛 + 1 − 𝑛𝛾)𝜑]
4𝑛(𝑛 + 1)𝑏
+ (1 − 𝛼) 𝑛 
4(𝑛 + 1)(𝑎 − 𝑤 − 𝜑)
𝑏𝑛4(𝑛 + 1)
 
=
𝛼[2(𝑛 + 1)(𝑎 − 𝑤) − (𝑛 + 1)𝑑 − 2(𝑛 + 1 − 𝑛𝛾)𝜑]
2(𝑛 + 1)𝑏
+ (1 − 𝛼) 
2(𝑛 + 1)(𝑎 − 𝑤 − 𝜑)
𝑏2(𝑛 + 1)
 
=
a − 𝑤 −
𝛼
2 𝑑 − (1 −
𝛼𝑛𝛾
𝑛 + 1) 𝜑
𝑏
 . 
Now all the sectors are linked. (Richter 2014, 15). 
 
Next, we examine increasing international trade via two different avenues, decreasing the transaction 
costs of trade and therefore increasing the volume of trade, and opening new sectors to trade. We start 
with the lowered trade costs. 
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7.1. Changes in Trade Costs 
In partial equilibriums the wage was a part of costs, so a decrease in wage level decreased an 
environmental tax and increased output in both sector types. From the full employment equation of 
general oligopolistic equilibrium, the wage can be solved as 
𝑤 = a − 𝑏𝐿 −
𝛼𝑑
2
 − (1 − 𝛼
𝑛𝛾
𝑛 + 1
)𝜑.                                                     (12) 
An increase of trade cost d decreases the wage w” 
𝜕𝑤
𝜕𝑑
= −
𝛼
2
< 0. 
This is because a decrease in trade costs decreases total costs, which in turn increases production 
amounts. This leads to increasing demand of labor.  Because the labor supply is inelastic, the wage must 
increase so that the demand of labor returns to a level of full employment. We see that the bigger the 
share of open sectors, α, and therefore the bigger the total share of firms directly affected by trade cost 
decrease, the bigger is also the effect of decreased trade costs on wage. (Richter 2014).  
Because the wage effects the tax, the effect of lowered trade costs on wage effects environmental taxes 
via wage. This is an indirect effect the trade cost has on tax. It has already been shown that in open 
sectors lowering the trade cost directly decreases an environmental tax, and this is the direct effect the 
decreased trade cost has on environmental tax. The total effect can be calculated by combining these 
two effects, either by adding them together as in Richter (2014, 17) or by inserting the wage function 
(12) into the tax equation (11). Using the latter way, the environmental tax in open sectors can be 
written as 
𝑡𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑛(𝑧) =  
−2(𝑛 + 1) (𝑎 − 𝑎 + 𝑏𝐿 +
𝛼𝑑
2  + (1 − 𝛼
𝑛𝛾
𝑛 + 1)𝜑) +
(𝑛 + 1)𝑑 + 2(2𝑛 + 1)(𝑛 + 1 − 𝑛𝛾)𝜑
4𝑛(𝑛 + 1)
. 
Taking a derivative regarding trade cost by considering both, a direct and indirect effect we get 
𝜕𝑡𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑛(𝑧)
𝜕𝑑
=
−2(𝑛 + 1) (
𝛼𝑑
2  ) +
(𝑛 + 1)𝑑
4𝑛(𝑛 + 1)
 
𝜕𝑡𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑛(𝑧)
𝜕𝑑
 =
1 − 𝛼
4𝑛
. 
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An indirect effect is negative, but the direct effect is positive. The direct effect is bigger because 1-α > 0, 
and therefore the total derivative is positive. This means that a decrease in trade costs lowers an 
environmental tax in open sectors, but less so the bigger the indirect effect is. It can be concluded that 
more sectors there are already involved in trade, (bigger the α), the less environmental tax decreases 
when trade costs decrease. (Richter 2014). 
 
The same analysis can be done with closed sectors. There trade costs have no direct effect on tax, but an 
indirect effect exists, so we insert a wage (12) into tax equation and get 
𝑡𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑑(𝑧) =
(𝑛 + 1)𝜑 − 𝑎 + 𝑎 − 𝑏𝐿 −
𝛼𝑑
2  − (1 − 𝛼
𝑛𝛾
𝑛 + 1)𝜑
𝑛
. 
And take a derivative regarding trade costs: 
𝜕𝑡𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑑(𝑧)
𝜕𝑑
=
−𝛼
2𝑛
. 
As in open sectors, the derivative of indirect effect is negative. This means that an environmental tax 
increases as a result of lowered trade costs. The more sectors there are involved in trade, (bigger the α), 
the bigger is the increase of tax in closed sectors. (Richter 2014). 
 
Proposition 1. When the trade costs are lowered, an indirect effect raises the environmental tax in all 
sectors. However, in open sectors, the direct effect dominates, so the tax increases only in closed sectors. 
 
 
7.2. Changes in The Share of Open Sectors  
An increase in the number of open sectors, i.e. opening new sectors to trade, has no direct effect on 
environmental tax because α is not a component of tax in either sector type. However, as in the case of 
the lowered trade costs, there is an indirect effect via the wage level. As already shown, an increase in 
wage increases environmental taxes, and we can take a derivative regarding the share of open sectors 
to find out the indirect effect: 
25 
 
𝜕𝑤
𝜕𝛼
= −
𝑑
2
+
𝑛𝛾𝜑
𝑛 + 1
. 
If the perceived marginal environmental damage  
𝜑 >
(𝑛 + 1)𝑑
𝑛𝛾2
, 
an increase in the number of open sectors increases the wage level. The lower the share of domestically 
produced negative externality is (high γ), the more likely an increase in the number of open sectors will 
increase the wage level. The same effect happens if the perceived marginal environmental damage itself 
is high. The lower the trade costs, the more likely an increase in the percentage of open sectors will 
increase the wage level. (Richter 2014).  
 
Proposition 2. An increase in the number of open sectors will more likely indirectly raise environmental 
tax in both open and closed sectors, if trade costs are low, if pollutant is mainly foreign, or if the 
perceived marginal environmental damage is sufficiently high. 
 
 
7.3. Effects in General Equilibrium 
Naturally, the change in wage causes the demand of labor to change to opposite direction. Should the 
supply of labor be treated as a variable, the wage level would be affected at the rate of -b. As already 
shown, decreased trade costs increase wage. In open sectors trade costs are included in production 
functions, and we get their total effect on labor market by inserting the wage function (12) in to the 
open sectors’ demand of labor function: 
𝐿𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑛 =
𝛼𝑛 [4(𝑛 + 1) (a − (a − 𝑏𝐿 −
𝛼𝑑
2  − (1 − 𝛼
𝑛𝛾
𝑛 + 1)𝜑)) − 2
(𝑛 + 1)𝑑 − 4(𝑛 + 1 − 𝑛𝛾)𝜑]
4𝑛(𝑛 + 1)𝑏
. 
We derivate regarding the trade costs: 
𝜕𝐿𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑛
𝜕𝑑
= −
𝛼
2𝑏
− 
𝛼
𝑏
(−𝛼 )
2
=
−𝛼 + 𝛼2 
2𝑏
< 0. 
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The first term, the direct effect, is negative, and because it is larger than the effect via wage, the 
demand of labor moves to opposite direction from trade costs. This means that the demand of labor in 
open sectors increases, and as a result the labor moves from closed sectors to open sectors. The closed 
sectors lose labor exactly the amount that moves to open sectors. We can insert the wage in the 
demand of labor in closed sectors as we just did with open ones and get 
𝐿𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑑 = (1 − 𝛼) 
2(𝑛 + 1)(a − (a − 𝑏𝐿 −
𝛼𝑑
2  − (1 − 𝛼
𝑛𝛾
𝑛 + 1)𝜑) − 𝜑)
𝑏2(𝑛 + 1)
. 
Taking a derivative: 
𝜕𝐿𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑑
𝜕𝑑
=  
(1 − 𝛼)(𝛼) 
2𝑏
=
𝛼 − 𝛼2 
2𝑏
 >  0 
Derivative is positive, meaning that lower trade costs lower the demand of labor in closed sectors 
freeing labor to move to open sectors. (Richter 2014). 
 
 
8. CONCLUSION 
The general oligopolistic equilibrium model is proper for studying oligopolistic behavior, because it 
enables the separation between the national economy and the sector level. For this reason, oligopolistic 
firms can be treated as having some market power inside their sectors, but not in the whole economy. 
For its flexibility the model provides a suitable approach for oligopolistic competition even when the 
companies differ from one another, or when there are multiple countries.  
 In chapter six I prove that international trade does not always lower environmental standards. 
In Neary’s general equilibrium model, where two countries trade, an environmental 
tax can even be higher in open sectors, than in closed sectors, and more likely the higher the trade 
costs, the lower the wage level, the lower the perceived marginal environmental damage, and/or 
the lower the share of pollutant being foreign.   
I also show that when the transaction costs of trade are lowered, an environmental tax does lower at 
open sectors, but less so when the share of trading sectors is bigger. On the closed sectors an 
environmental tax increases. 
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An increase in the number of open sectors will more likely raise environmental tax in both open and 
closed sectors, if trade costs are low, if pollutant is mainly foreign, or if the perceived marginal 
environmental damage is sufficiently high.  
These results are encouraging now that the quality of environment is a cause of great concern, but 
hopefully there will be more studies of the subject. The more information there is, the more 
likely politicians and the general public alike can be convinced that environmental standards do not have 
to be lowered in order to increase trade. 
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